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The aim of this paper is to research the institutional
environment in SEE countries (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Romania and Serbia) and its importance in attracting FDI
inflows. Several regression models are created to determine
the significance of chosen location determinants. The models
include institutional variables about the transition progress,
government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, but also
variables about the economic characteristics of the SEE
region such as GDP per capita, growth rate, inflation and
wages. The results of the panel data analysis indicated the
importance of economic determinants (GDP p.c. and
inflation) to FDI inflows, while among institutional factors,
only corruption, large scale privatisation, the development of
trade and forex systems, and overall infrastructure reform
have a significant impact on FDI inflows. Property rights
freedom and small scale privatisation are not significant
variables. When we reduce multicollinearity, we
conclude that GDP p.c., inflation, the trade and
forex systems, corruption and overall infrastructure
reform remain significant variables in explaining the
economic and institutional determinants of FDI inflows.
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INTRODUCTION
In times of scarce domestic capital and investments, foreign
direct investments (FDIs) are needed to push forward the do-
mestic economy and employment. They are usually seen as a
solution to boost economic growth and exports and they may
help achieve modernisation, industrial upgrading and im-
prove productivity by importing foreign technologies, diffus-
ing knowledge and Western best practices. Developing coun-
tries often try to attract more FDI with their own economic
policies and incentives, in the expectation of a positive impact
on the domestic economy.
The countries of Southeast Europe (SEE) have gone through
a process of transition, accompanied by liberalisation and pri-
vatisation, where foreign capital has played a very important
role. Not all SEE countries have been equally successful in
attracting foreign capital and their position depends on the spe-
cific location and institutional characteristics of each country.
TheWestern Balkan states were faced with disintegration pro-
cesses and a lack of mutual cooperation until the 2000s. Be-
cause of this, they have been lagging behind Central and East
European (CEE) countries in terms of the amount of FDI. For
example, in the period between 1993 and 2011, among the CEE
countries, Estonia received EUR 10,507, Czech Republic EUR
7,418 and Hungary EUR 5,962 per inhabitant, while in the re-
gion of the SEE countries, Montenegro (EUR 6,500) and Cro-
atia (EUR 5,787) received the largest amount of FDI per inha-
bitant.
The question is: what determines FDI inflows in the SEE
region? This region is not as large as the CEEmarket (total po-
pulation), so market size (population) is probably not the most
influential factor where FDI inflows are concerned. The as-
sumption is that the influential factors are the following: GDP
per inhabitant, wage level, infrastructure development, as well
as institutional frameworks, which may be the reason for the
unsatisfactory amount of inward FDI.
There has been a lot of analysis of the attractiveness of a
particular country or a group of similar countries (Markusen,
1998; Markusen & Venables, 1998). Location determinants are
a very broad concept and include traditional factors such as
the availability of natural resources (prices, infrastructure), mar-
ket size (living standards, wages, production costs), the macro-
economic environment (inflation, unemployment, interest rates,
GDP growth rates); however, we must not forget institutional
factors (property rights, FDI incentives, bilateral trade/invest-
ment agreements, taxes, etc.).
In the case of developing countries, institutional frame-
works are crucial as a guarantee of market functioning (Glo-216
berman & Shapiro, 2002). Institutional weaknesses, frequent
changes in laws and inefficiency (slowness) of public admini-
stration, may cause a weak inflow or the absence of FDI in-
flows. The inclusion of institutions in relation to FDI inflows
is particularly important for developing countries, because de-
veloped countries have strong institutional frameworks con-
ducive to business development and market forces.
The reliability and safety of institutions has emerged in e-
conomic literature (North, 1991; Coase, 2002; Williamson, 2000;
North, 2005), in the first place as a catalyst for growth (Edison,
2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004; Rodrik, 2004) and
as an inward-FDI attractormainly in transition economies (Pour-
narakis & Varsakelis, 2004; Bevan & Estrin, 2004).1 A nation's
institutional environment is the set of political, economic, so-
cial and legal conventions that establish the foundational ba-
sis for production and exchange (Oxley, 1999; Sobel, 2002). New
institutional economics extends economics with social and le-
gal norms that influence market functioning in the neoclassi-
cal framework. The idea is to include the efficiency of institu-
tions in the analysis of market economies. It includes a varie-
ty of indicators such as: property rights, governance efficien-
cy, social norms and social capital, human assets, asymmetric
information, strategic behaviour, opportunism, moral hazard,
contractual safeguards, monitoring costs, incentives to col-
lude, hierarchical structures, etc. Institutions, i.e. legal, politi-
cal and administrative systems tend to be internationally im-
mobile frameworks whose costs determine the international
attractiveness of a location. Institutions may not be only con-
sidered as preconditions for FDI, they have also been built in
the process of transition because there is interaction between
foreign investors and institutions in the host countries. Pro-
blems occur in defining the coverage of institutions and inmea-
suring institutional development.2
The goal of this paper is to find out the role of institutions
in attracting FDI inflows in the SEE region and to determine
the relation between institutional factors and levels of FDI. The
paper is organized into 4 chapters. The following chapter is a
review of the literature, the third chapter focuses on research
(methodology and results), and the fourth is the conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Determinants of FDI
There are many determinants that influence a country's abili-
ty to attract foreign capital depending on the level of devel-
opment of a particular country. In the case of developing coun-
tries, the most important factors are market size, production217
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costs, availability of production factors, and institutional frame-
work regarding market functioning i.e. property rights, admi-
nistration, establishment of new commercial enterprises, stimu-
lation measures etc. During the 1990s, privatisationwas a strong
factor in receiving foreign capital (Bevan & Estrin, 2004). The
significance of institutional factors is lower when we observe
and analyse FDI flows among developed countries, because
these countries already have institutional frameworks which
are "invisible" in their long-term market oriented economies.
Dunning (1992) introduced an eclectic paradigm, known
as the OLI paradigm, with three important elements needed
in order to motivate investment in a particular country: own-
ership, location and internalisation advantages. Dunning's lo-
cation advantages include: supply side (labour skills and costs,
corporate taxation), demand side (market size and growth),
and political and social infrastructure. Since Dunning's initial
paradigm did not specifically include institutional factors, be-
ing principally focused on economic factors, Dunning (2006)
emphasized the importance of institutional factors in an ex-
tension of the model. It has also been suggested that institu-
tions affect all three components of the paradigm (Dunning &
Lundan, 2008).
The focus in this paper will be on those determinants of
FDI which influence the investor's decision as to where to in-
vest. Although institutional factors are important for building
the confidence of foreign investors, the analysis of other fac-
tors (market size, GDP growth rates, labour costs, etc.) prevail
in research relating to localization determinants. Growth rates
are an important localization factor, so the fastest growing coun-
tries are also the biggest FDI-host countries (Balasubraman-
yam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1996; Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee,
1998; DeMello, 1999; Merlevede, 2000; Zhang, 2001). Frey and
Schneider (1985) find that the determinants of FDI inflows in
less developed countries may be best explained by a combi-
nation of political and economic variables.
What should be analysed in the functioning of institu-
tions? Only formal institutions and administrative actions, or
should we include informal elements which influence beha-
viour and non-commercial operating results (Schmieding, 1993)?
Grogan and Moers (2001) consider institutions in terms of
property rights, the effective application of laws and regula-
tions, and the degree of corruption. It is difficult to approach
institutions in a wholly right way, and to incorporate all that
the word 'institution' encompasses.
The recent situation in the SEE region has highlighted the
importance of an enabling institutional environment in reap-
ing the maximum benefits from FDI inflows. In the last deca-
des there have been various analyses of the importance of in-218
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stitutions with regard to their efficiency and power to attract
foreign capital (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; IMF, 2003). Daude
and Stein (2007) find that poor institutions can act as a tax bur-
den, and therefore as a cost, to FDI. Aizenman and Spiegel
(2006) find that institutional efficiency is strongly correlated
with the ratio of FDI to total domestic investment. Rodrik et
al. (2004) distinguish four types of institution: market creating
institutions that protect property rights and make contracts
fair and reliable; market regulating institutions that help reg-
ulate market externalities, imperfect and asymmetric infor-
mation or economic scales in sectors like transportation, tele-
communication or environment; market stabilising institutions
that reduce macroeconomic instabilities and prevent major cri-
ses; and market legitimising institutions which support social
protection andmanage social conflict. Kogut and Spicer (2002),
and Stiglitz (1999) think that the establishment of new insti-
tutions is at least as important as more conventional macro-
economic policy objectives. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2004) include: political stability, government effectiveness, re-
gulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. La Por-
ta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) include a pro-
perty rights index, a business regulation index, corruption, and
bureaucratic delays. Based on a large sample of 73 developed
and developing countries, Egger and Winner (2005) found a
positive relationship between corruption and FDI.
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, andMayer (2007) investigated the
quality of institutions (bureaucracy, corruption, information,
a banking sector, and legal institutions) in home and host coun-
tries, and found that institutional distance tends to reduce bi-
lateral FDI flows. Brunetti, Kisunko, andWeder (1997) connec-
ted the differences in the degree of predictability of FDI in-
flows related to institutional framework in transition coun-
tries. The significant degree of differences in FDI across the range
of transition economies could be explained by expectations of
unstable or stable institutional frameworks. Buchanan, Le, and
Rishi (2012) made a panel data analysis of 164 countries from
1996 to 2006, and examined the impact of institutional quality
on FDI levels and volatility. They found that good institutional
quality has a positive and significant effect on FDI.
FDI in the SEE Region
Although the countries in the region share some common fea-
tures (corruption, non-application of the rule of law, slow admi-
nistration, adverse business environment), there are some diffe-
rences between them in terms of success and their attractive-
ness to foreign investors. Croatia is the most developed coun-
try in the region, with GDP per capita of EUR 10,400 (which219
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is 61% of the EU-27 average), followed by Romania and Bulga-
ria, and Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are at the bot-
tom of the list (30% of the EU-27 average). In terms of FDI in-
flows in absolute values, Romania and Bulgaria as the biggest
countries of the region occupy top positions, but in terms of
relative values Montenegro and Croatia attract the highest
inflow per capita. It is interesting that Croatia had the highest
FDI stock per capita until 2010, when Montenegro took over
this position. These numbers were the result of the policy of
opening the Montenegrin economy to foreign investment, as
well as of incentive policies (mostly in terms of tax reliefs –
Montenegro has the lowest profit tax rate of only 9%). Alba-
nia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have attracted
the least FDI per capita because of: corruption, geopolitical risk,
lack of modern infrastructure, the lack of commitment to true
reforms (Vaknin, 2011). It should be pointed out that Serbia
has managed to attract the biggest number of greenfield pro-
jects (over 100 in 2008 and 2011). At the same time, Croatia has
attracted 50-odd such projects, with the largest share of FDI
in the services sector (banking, telecommunications, tourism)
(WIIW, 2012). It is also interesting to point out the difference
in tax rates on profits – Croatia has the highest rate, which is
twice as high as the rate in most SEE countries (where most
have a rate of 10%).
The SEE countries, separately, are usually not the subject
of analysis in terms of FDI determinants. Demekas, Horvath,
Ribakova, andWu (2007) researched the location factors of host
economies in the countries of Central, Eastern and Southern
Europe, and in the Baltic States. They found no explanatory
factors specific to Southeast Europe at work, while for other
countries the results are in line with expectations: high unit
labour costs, a high corporate tax burden, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, high import tariffs, discourage non-privatisation-related
FDI, while a liberal foreign exchange and trade regime, and
advanced reforms in the infrastructure sector, encourage it.
Zeghni and Fabry (2006) investigated the role of institutions
in attracting FDI inflows in 11 post-communist European eco-
nomies (including, among others, Croatia, Romania and Bul-
garia). The results confirm their expectations that FDI is sen-
sitive to specific and local institutional arrangements.
In this analysis we deal with the aggregate data of FDI
inflows and do not include bilateral FDI flows (as Bevan &
Estrin, 2004), because EU member states are the main inves-
tors in the SEE region (for example, in Croatia about 90% of
total FDI inflows come from the EU). These countries have
good governance infrastructure; however, the level of institu-
tional development of the SEE countries is also important.220
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The contribution of this paper is the following: analysis is
carried out on a group of SEE countries not usually observed
separately; in previous researches they are grouped together
under the heading of developing countries or countries in
transition. Moreover, previous researches do not include all
countries of the SEE region, because they started to be active
in the international community relatively recently (late 1990s).
The problem arises with regard to statistical data for these
countries, as well as data about levels of institutional deve-
lopment. The data have been available for only a short period
(and some data are still missing), and these are the limitations
to the method used in this research. There is no previous re-




In total, the final sample includes data from eight countries in
Southeast Europe in the period 2001-2010. The summary sta-
tistics and correlation matrix for the variables are provided in
the Appendix. A large number of potential determinants of FDI
has been analysed in the literature. However, our focus is spe-
cific to the role of institutions. The control variables are GDP
per capita, wages and inflation. GDP per capita is a measure
of a country's purchasing power and is expected to have a
positive effect on FDI. This variable is important for market-
-seeking FDI, which is replacing export driven FDI, and is ori-
ented toward supplying domestic markets. Wages reflect the
cost of labour and also, indirectly, productivity differences
among the countries. Low wages are also an important loca-
tion determinant, because they can influence the reduction of
production costs and increase profitability. Finally, inflation is
meant to measure instability at the macro level, which seems
to be unfavourable for capital accumulation and economic
growth, as it degrades the business climate. Adverse economic
conditions do not only discourage foreign interest, but also
reduce the productivity effect (Prüfer & Tondl, 2008).
In order to take into account the role of institutions, we
rely on three main sources, namely: the EBRD transition indi-
cators, Economic Freedom data (The Heritage Foundation),
and Transparency International. We aremainly concernedwith
variables which can affect the decision of MNCs to invest in a
country. These include an effective system of property rights,
infrastructure reform, and non-corrupt public officials (since
corruption might significantly delay the start of business ope-
rations and result in a withdrawal from investments, both fo-221
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reign and domestic). Government policies encouraging a free
and open market are also an important FDI determinant.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
publishes the Transition Report, in which it processes many
indicators to assess improvements in large scale privatisation,
small scale privatisation, trade liberalisation, price liberalisa-
tion, competition policy, restructuring economies, and overall
infrastructure reform (roads, railways, telecommunication, wa-
ter supply etc.). The scores are from 1 to 4+, and are based on
an assessment of the size of challenges in terms of two com-
ponents: market structure and market-supporting institutions
and policies. They measure the transition gap (deviation from
efficient market structure). Score 1 to 2 means that there is a
large transition gap, and score 4 or 4+ means that this gap is
negligible. The ratings of overall infrastructure reform are cal-
culated as the average of five infrastructure reform indicators
covering electric power, railways, roads, telecommunications,
water and waste water. The influence of the EBRD indicators
on FDI inflows is positive (EBRD, 2012).
The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation pu-
blish the Index of Economic Freedom which covers 10 free-
doms grouped into four broad categories: rule of law (prop-
erty freedom, freedom from corruption), limited government
(fiscal freedom, government spending), regulatory efficiency
(business freedom, labour freedom, monetary freedom) and
open markets (trade freedom, market freedom, financial free-
dom). Each of these freedoms is scored on a scale of 1 to 100,
where 100 represents the maximum freedom.
Transparency International measures levels of corrup-
tion in the public sector, and assesses the Corruption Percep-
tion Index (CPI), starting from 1995. It is a composite index, a
combination of polls, drawing on corruption-related data col-
lected by a variety of reputable institutions. A scale of 0 – 10
is applied to measure the perception of corruption, where 0
means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10
means that a country is perceived as not corrupt. The expect-
ed impact of the CPI on FDI inflows is positive (a higher score
means less corruption).
A common problem of institutional variables is their mea-
surement. Since most data are collected from surveys, they
might reflect the subjective views of managers and other stake-
holders. Apart from the above-mentioned sources, there are
other sources used in the literature, such as theWorldwide Go-
vernance Index, the World Bank Doing Business Index, and
the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic
Forum (institutions are one of the 12 pillars of competitiveness).
These will not be discussed here because they will not be used
in further analysis due to differences inmethodology and scope,
as well as the overlapping of similar institutional variables.222
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From this short review, it is clear that there are different
approaches to measuring institutional development, as well
as different methodologies. These are the limitations to the in-
clusion of institutional variables of different organisations, and
point to the invalidity of their comparison. Some institutions
show a country's success score (points), others produce only
ranks, and the number of countries under analysis varies from
year to year. Because of this, in the group of institutional vari-
ables, the model will include: EBRD transition indicators (en-
terprise restructuring, large scale privatisation, small scale pri-
vatisation, trade and forex systems, overall infrastructure re-
form), property rights freedom from the Heritage Foundation,
and the corruption perception index from Transparency In-
ternational. The data set covers the period 2001-2010.
Methodology and model
Considering that the sample has a cross-sectional dimension,
represented by countries (i = 1; : : : ; N) and a longitudinal
dimension, represented by a time series (t = 1; : : : ; T periods),
the panel data method will be used (Hsiao, 2003). The SEE
countries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cro-
atia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia. The sample
comprises unbalanced panel data, i.e. there are some time pe-
riods missing from some units in the population of interest.
We used random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) esti-
mation methods, which allow us to deal with the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity. While the FEmodels capture coun-
try-specific effects with αi, which do not change over time, the
RE method incorporates heterogeneity among the countries
by including a specific unobservable effect (εit) in the error term.
All models are tested using the Hausman test to decide be-
tween RE and FE and standard errors that are robust to he-
teroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The Hausman test fails
to reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients
is not systematic, thus favouring random effects in several mo-
dels. However, the Lagrangemultiplier test favours pooledOLS
over random effect, while the F test indicates that there is a
correlation between unobserved fixed effects and indepen-
dent variables. Furthermore, we are not interested in making
broader inferences from our findings beyond the group we
have as the sample, thus the use of fixed effects is most cer-
tainly warranted. Moreover, the institutional variables are spe-
cific to this group of countries since the progress in terms of
reforms is not uniform.
Wemodel several specifications in order to deal withmul-
ticollinearity among the institutional variables. This approach
is widely followed in the literature (e.g.Walsh &Yu, 2010; Chak-
rabarti, 2001). The correlation matrix shows that, in general,223
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multicollinearity is not a serious problem. The highest corre-
lation is observed betweenGDP per capita and corruption (0,70).
However, interpretation should bemade cautiously since some
institutional variables included in the model may also capture
the effects of omitted institutions. Therefore, in the last three
models we simultaneously included several institutional vari-
ables to deal with the omitted variable bias. The dependent
variable and control variables (GDP per capita, inflation, wages,
growth rate) were logged to interpret the coefficient as elasti-
cities. Furthermore, taking logs enabled us to scale down the
variation in data and generate better results in terms of sta-
tistical significance and standard errors.3 The institutional va-
riables are constructed as indices and therefore are not logged.
All models are corrected for autocorrelation and heterosceda-
sticity by using cluster robust standard errors.
A common problemwhen trying to identify the effects of
institutions on economic outcomes is that countries are not e-
xogenously endowedwith institutions that promote good go-
vernance (Buchanan et al., 2012). It is reasonable to assume that
FDI is not only influenced by institutional frameworks, because
once MNCs are located in the host country, they may demand
better institutions, thus creating the reverse causality problem.
For example, survey respondents may perceive the host coun-
try's institutional framework as weak because they observe
very low levels of FDI. This again leads to the reverse causali-
ty problem, since it is not only institutions that affect econo-
mic performance, but also economic variables affect the per-
ceived institutions of a country. One way to deal with the si-
multaneity bias is to use the GMM estimator. However, the
latter is designed for large N and small T as cluster robust stan-
dard errors and the autocorrelation tests are unreliable (Rood-
man, 2009). Furthermore, estimates are biased and imprecise
and serial correlation is not an issue according to the Wool-
dridge test. Therefore, the use of the static panel model is justi-
fied. Another approach is to use instrumental variable regres-
sion. However, it is very difficult to find good instruments as
the quality of institutions is probably determined by more
fundamental and historical reasons. Given that we have a ve-
ry small sample of countries that have undergone the trans-
formation process from centrally planned to market-oriented
economies, and are a relatively homogenous group in terms
of legal origin, we decided to use one-period lagged values of
institutional variables in FE regressions to partially control for
simultaneity bias which might occur given the fact that qual-
ity of institutions affect FDI and vice versa.4 Furthermore, lags
of institutional variables enable us to capture time lag between
their development and their influence on FDI. Finally, empiri-
cal tests suggest that simultaneity is not a problem in our regres-
sions, thus confirming our decision to use FE (Appendix).5224
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The relationship between FDI inflows and their determi-
nants is as follows:
FDI Inflowsit=α+β1 GDP per capitait+β2 wagesit+
+β3 inflationit+β4 Xit+εit
i=1...N; t=1...T
where the dependent variable is FDI inflows and the in-
dependent variables are: GDP per capita, inflation, wages,
growth rate and institutional variables: enterprise restructur-
ing, large scale privatisation, small scale privatisation, corrup-
tion perception index, property rights freedom, trade and fo-
rex systems. FDI inflows are taken as the dependent variable
because these countries have very low FDI outflows, and the
goal is to determine the impact of the independent variables
on their FDI attractiveness and the dynamics of inflows (rather
than FDI stock).6 The data are taken from WIIW (2012).
The first model includes the economic location determi-
nants of a particular market: GDP per capita, inflation, growth
rate andwages. GDP per capita is used as a proxy for purchasing
power in the host country, inflation as a proxy for price stability,
andwages reflect the labour costs towhich the efficiency type of
FDI is very sensitive. Only GDP per capita is significant and
it has the expected sign. Model 2 includes enterprise restruc-
turing and model 3 includes reforms in trade and exchange rate
policies, but neither variable is significant. According to model
4, GDP per capita has the expected sign, but is no longer sig-
nificant, while corruption perception and inflation are. The sign
of inflation is contrary to expectations, suggesting that macro-
economic instability leads tomore FDI inflows. Themagnitude of
corruption suggests that a one standard deviation increase in this
dimension would increase FDI by a factor of 2.07 (exp 0.731).
The property right index is included in model 5 and it
has a positive influence on FDI inflow, although not signifi-
cant. Privatisation in the transition countries was the main
channel of foreign capital inflows in the initial stage of the libe-
ralisation of financial flows and we expected a positive im-
pact of privatisation on FDI inflows. Model 6 shows a positive
and a significant influence of large scale privatisation, while
small scale privatisation does not have a significant influence
on FDI inflow.Model 7 incorporates enterprise restructuring and
corruption as the main institutional variables. Again, corrup-
tion has a statistically positive sign, as do wages and inflation,
while GDP per capita loses its significance. Models 8 and 9 try
to incorporate more institutional variables, but in these cases
only trade and forex reform and corruption have a significant
influence on FDI inflows among other institutional variables.
The results are partly in accordance with the results of
Zeghni and Fabry (2006), but also differ in the last two models
where they show a significant simultaneous effect of various225
DRU[. ISTRA@. ZAGREB




institutional variables on FDI trends. But there are limitations
to the comparisons: they consider only three countries in the
SEE region (Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) and use data from
the period 1992-2003, during which period institutional struc-
tures changed significantly, and therefore institutional indica-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The findings suggest that corruption, GDP per capita,
and inflation play an important role as determinants of FDI.
The fact that GDP per capita loses its significance when cor-
ruption is included might be a sign of multicollinearity. The
relatively high correlations between these variables could ac-
tually preclude the identification of the partial effects of GDP
per capita of a country and of its institutions.
One solution to reduce multicollinearity is to drop the
variable, but by doing so one would make a specification er-
ror if the true coefficient of variable that is dropped is differ-
ent from zero. Therefore, we decided to examine how cor-
ruption and GDP per capita interact. By introducing nonli-
nearity into the model, we are able to gain some insight into
the impact of GDP per capita at different levels of corruption.
Model 10 – FE Model 11 – FE Model 12 – FE Model 13 – FE
GDP p.c. 7.3648*** 6.4986** 6.3738** 13.8391***
(2.1684) (2.1497) (2.5113) (1.9130)
Wages -0.5455 1.0947* 0.9936 0.3946
(1.2158) (0.5289) (0.6150) (0.5428)
Inflation 0.0319 0.0452* 0.0454* 0.0624**
(0.040) (0.0216) (0.0220) (0.0225)
Enterprise restructuring -1.3432** -1.1574 -0.4572
(0.5472) (0.7735) (0.6116)
Trade and forex system 0.2431 1.8625***
(0.5339) (0.4843)
Corruption 11.9549** 9.3672*** 8.3996** 7.5008***
(4.0774) (2.6730) (3.2083) (1.5373)
Property rights freedom 0.0015
(0.0157)
GDP p.c.*corruption -1.3565** -0.9477** -0.8517** -0.8011***
(0.4475) (0.2872) (0.3425) (0.1798)
Large privatisation
Small privatisation
Overall infrastructure reform -0.2112 -0.8303**
(0.6899) (0.3176)
R-sq. 0.32 0.70 0.70 0.80
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
F test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0938 0.9189 0.5574 0.0520
Observation 63 63 63 53
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inflows in the SEE
countries (nonlinearity)
GDP per capita remains highly significant in explaining
FDI in the selected countries. The results suggest that a 1% in-
crease in GDP per capita leads to an increase in FDI from 6.37%
to 13.83%. The corruption perception index still remains sig-
nificant as well as the interaction term. The point index of cor-
ruption implies that an increase by one point in this variable
leads to an 11 percent increase in FDI in model 10. The inter-
action term indicates that in the countries with higher cor-
ruption the effect of GDP per capita on FDI is less relevant. In
model 11, enterprise restructuring becomes significant and in-
dicates that progress in restructuring keeps MNCs away from
a host country due to the competition effect. In model 12, we
repeated the specification from model 8 and augmented it
with the interaction term. However, it seems that trade and
forex reform has little influence on FDI, while GDP per capi-
ta, corruption and the interaction term play an important role
as FDI determinants. Finally, in model 13, we incorporated all
institutional variables to account for possible omitted variable
bias. It seems that a combination of institutions provide the
best results in attracting FDI. This provides policy makers with
some interesting implications. It seems that foreign investors
are not attracted only by low levels of corruption, but also by
other institutional variables, such as trade and forex reform,
as well as infrastructure reform which seems to negatively
affect FDI inflows.
CONCLUSION
Institutional development is an important determinant in at-
tracting foreign investment to developing countries, particu-
larly to countries in transition. The SEE region can be attractive
to foreign investors because of its location advantages: GDP
per capita, abundance of resources, but also because of the sa-
fety of investments (meaning a good regulatory framework and
institutional efficiency).
The indicators of institutional development (EBRD, World
Bank, Heritage Foundation) point out many weaknesses in
the SEE region: a relatively high perception of corruption, the
poor development of institutions in terms of competitiveness,
poor credit ratings, inefficient government, rule of law, poli-
tical stability.
The regression results pointed to the importance of eco-
nomic determinants in FDI inflows (GDP p.c. and inflation),
while among institutional factors only corruption, large scale
privatisation, the development of trade and forex systems,
and overall infrastructure reform have a significant impact.
Surprisingly, property rights freedom is not as significant a va-228
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riable as small scale privatisation. The limitation of the model
is that it could not include more variables because of data
availability or because of the correlation with the observed va-
riables. When we reduce multicollinearity, it can be seen that
GDP p.c., inflation, trade and forex system, corruption and
overall infrastructure reform remain significant variables in
explaining the economic and institutional determinants of
FDI inflows. The influence of institutional variables changed
as we extended the model with additional institutional vari-
ables; moreover, their impact on FDI inflows is relatively low
(in comparison with GDP p.c.).
A greater influence of institutional indicators on FDI in-
flows was expected, but the economic determinants were do-
minant with their force and significance, thus institutions turned
out not to be crucial for foreign investors. However, it should
be noted that all the countries have recorded significant im-
provements in institutional infrastructure in the last 10 years,
which is why the importance of institutions is lower since they
are perceived as effective in advance. The structure of FDI,
which is largely focused on the services sector, indicates that
foreign investments come to supply the domesticmarket, which
favours the notion that economic determinants attract FDI.
NOTES
1 North (1991) indicates two types of institutional constraints: formal
rules (constitution, laws, property rights) and informal restraints
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct), which
usually contribute to the perpetuation of order and safety within a
market or society. In his paper from 2005, he points out that econo-
mic performance is determined by the kind and quality of institu-
tions that support markets. Coase (2002) stresses the need to include
the functioning of institutions (legal, political, social and education-
al systems, culture, etc.) which create the environment where people
live (work, earn and spend their income) and companies operate
(and it greatly affects their cost and performance) in the analytical
framework of analysis in economics.
2 Williamson highlights four levels of institutions: L1-social theory;
L2-economics of property rights (positive political theory); L3-trans-
action cost economics; L4-neoclassical economics (agency theory).
The first level includes: norms, customs, traditions, religion, and given
that these elements change slowly over time, the level of these insti-
tutions is often taken as a given and economists do not monitor the
impact of its changes. The second level is the institutional environ-
ment and it refers to formal institutional aspects: the executive, legi-
slative, and judicial functions of bureaucratic government and the
degree of decentralisation (federalism). In respect of attracting FDI,
the protection of property rights is significant, as is the rule of law.
The fourth level refers to the adaptation of ex-ante companies to229
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prices and market conditions. Economists usually research the sec-
ond and the third institutional levels in analysis.
3 A common problem when the dependent variable is logged is how
to deal with observations with zero values. However, all countries in
our dataset contain data on FDI.
4 We tried to use several external instruments (ethno linguistic frac-
tionalisation and a dummy variable indicating that a country was a
part of Yugoslavia), but both instruments failed to pass proper iden-
tification tests.
5 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test was performed and
the results imply that there is no endogeneity in the models (Ap-
pendix – Table 5).
6 For example, in 2011 net FDI was EUR 7,657 and FDI inflows EUR
8,018. There is a small difference between FDI inflows and net FDI
in the SEE region.
APPENDIX
Variable Obs Mean SD Min. Max.
large_priv~n 80 3.14 0.553 1 4
small_priv~n 80 3.70 0.465 2 4.33
enterprise~g 80 2.30 0.417 1 3
trade_fore~m 80 4.01 0.490 2.67 4.33
overall_in~m 80 2.49 0.506 1.33 3.33
growth_rate 80 3.83 3.591 -8.5 9.4
cor_percep~x 71 3.30 0.541 2.3 4.4
property_r~m 67 29.03 9.384 10 50
loggdppc 80 8.88 0.345 8.16 9.67
logwages 80 5.82 0.579 4.75 6.96
logfdi_inf~w 78 6.69 1.286 3.78 9.16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 large_priv~n 1.000
2 small_priv~n 0.607 1.000
3 enterprise~g 0.686 0.765 1.000
4 trade_fore~m 0.807 0.767 0.694 1.000
5 overall_in~m 0.693 0.419 0.674 0.656 1.000
6 growth_rate -0.001 -0.040 -0.126 -0.050 -0.054 1.000
7 infl. -0.449 -0.299 -0.445 -0.391 -0.093 0.102 1.000
8 cor_percep~x 0.490 0.335 0.660 0.385 0.607 -0.241 -0.178 1.000
9 property_r~m 0.464 0.564 0.404 0.449 0.272 -0.169 0.128 0.318 1.000
10 loggdppc 0.476 0.453 0.690 0.330 0.582 -0.221 -0.100 0.700 0.356 1.000
11 logwages 0.025 0.220 0.444 0.073 0.197 -0.294 -0.302 0.377 -0.196 0.679 1.000
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Trade and forex system 1.002
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.317
Corruption perception index 2.608
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.106
Property rights index 1.871
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.171
Corruption perception index, overall 5.386
infrastructure reform, enterprise restructuring Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.146
Corruption perception index, trade and forex 2.136
system, enterprise restructuring Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.545
Corruption perception index, overall infra-
structure reform, enterprise restructuring, 3.238
trade and forex system, property rights index Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.663
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Institucionalni razvoj kao
odrednica atraktivnosti privlačenja
inozemnih izravnih ulaganja (FDI)
u Jugoistočnoj Europi
Ines KERSAN-ŠKABIĆ
Sveučilište Jurja Dobrile u Puli, Pula
Cilj rada jest istražiti institucionalno okruženje u zemljama
Jugoistočne Europe (Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina,
Bugarska, Hrvatska, Makedonija, Crna Gora, Rumunjska i
Srbija) i njegovo značenje u atraktivnosti zemalja regije za
privlačenje FDI-a. Izrađeno je nekoliko regresijskih modela
kako bi odredili važnost odabranih lokacijskih determinanti.
Modeli uključuju institucionalne varijable o napretku u
procesu tranzicije, efikasnosti vlade, vladavini prava,234
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korumpiranosti, ali i varijable o ekonomskim obilježjima SEE
regije, kao što su BDP po stanovniku, stopa rasta, inflacija i
plaće. Rezultati analize panel-podataka upućuju na značenje
ekonomskih odrednica (BDP p. c. i inflacije) u privlačenju
priljeva FDI-a, dok su među institucionalnim varijablama
samo razina korumpiranosti, privatizacija velikih poduzeća,
razvoj vanjskotrgovinskoga i deviznoga sustava te ukupne
infrastrukturne reforme, što osjetno utječe na priljeve FDI-a.
Sloboda (zaštita) imovinskih prava i privatizacija malih
poduzeća nisu značajne varijable. Nakon uklanjanja
multikolinearnosti možemo zaključiti da BDP p. c., inflacija,
trgovinski i devizni sustav, korumpiranost i ukupne
infrastrukturne reforme ostaju značajne varijable u
objašnjenju ekonomskih i institucionalnih odrednica priljeva
FDI-a.
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